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REASONING ABOUT THE FUTURE: THE





A debate about Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is not
simply a debate about technology.1 It is, rather, a debate about the
future interactions between technologies and institutions that our
choices today will set into motion. Arguments about such things are
difficult to make with any reliability, and it is easy to lapse into ex-
tremes. At one extreme is an unsophisticated optimism for which the
unpredictability of future events encourages us to err on the side of
progress. At another extreme is an unsophisticated pessimism for
which the possibilities for authoritarian misuse of information technol-
ogy encourage us to regulate it out of existence. To make prudent
choices about ITS, it is necessary to develop concepts that help clarify
the interactions between institutions and technologies. This article
will pay particular attention to the institutions of computer system de-
sign and technical standard-setting.2
The United States Department of Transportation and a non-profit
industry group called ITS America are currently engaged in an elabo-
rate process aimed at the creation of an "architecture" for American
ITS systems.3 This is a delicate process, driven by several
considerations:
Copyright 1995 by the author
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1. These systems were referred to until recently as Intelligent Vehicle-H-ighway Systems
(IVHS).
2. For a more extended discussion of these and related issues, see Philip E. Agre and
Christine A. Harbs, 7(3) SOCIAL CHOICE ABoUr PRIVACY: INTELLIGENT VEHICLE-HIGHWAY Sys-
TEMs IN THE UNrrED STATES, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND PEOPLE (1994), in press.
3. UmNTED STATES DEPARTmrr OF TRANSPORTATION AND IVHS AMERICA, IVHS ARcIm-
rurE DaV. PRoGRAM INTmM STATUs REP., Apr. 1994.
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(1) ITS systems are complex. The phrase ITS actually covers a
diverse group of technologies and services. Although it would be de-
sirable for these technologies and services to be designed to common
standards, various segments of the industry may acquire their own mo-
mentum independently of the others.
(2) Most U.S. roadways are controlled by state agencies, usually
with the aid of Federal funding. ITS system design is thus an occasion
for a complex negotiation of government and private roles in operat-
ing a significant portion of the country's infrastructure.
(3) Although as a marketing matter ITS systems need only be
standardized on a continent-by-continent basis, U.S. manufacturers
may find themselves competing with standards and systems currently
being developed in Europe and Japan. If American ITS systems were
to develop piecemeal through market selection among a welter of par-
tially defined architectures, the time required for a single "winning"
architecture to emerge might create a opening for better-coordinated
foreign alternatives.4
(4) The major industrial firms in the ITS America alliance may
have a common interest in developing a coherent American architec-
ture, but their interests diverge in other ways. Each firm has its own
distinctive strengths and styles, and the emerging architecture defini-
tion will set the terms of competition among these firms within the
American market.
Clearly, then, decisions about privacy in ITS systems will be
made will be made in a complicated institutional context. The stakes
for these institutions are high, given uncertainty about market accept-
ance of the systems that will emerge from this process. Past experi-
ence with ITS provides some precedent for concern. A proposed
road-pricing scheme in Hong Kong based on on Automatic Vehicle
Identification (AVI) encountered considerable resistance from advi-
sory boards and professional associations based on privacy concerns
and the interpretation of road use fees as unwelcome taxation.' At the
same time, even if ITS systems do not become legally mandatory, they
may be introduced in such a way that they become a practical neces-
sity for large parts of the population. Such a circumstance might arise,
for example, through the demands of insurance coverage or because of
the lengthening lines at now understaffed manual toll-paying stations.
4. Lawrence A. Berardinis, Smart highways get the green light, 64 MACHINE DESIGN
(1992), at 66-70.
5. Sandford F. Borins, Electronic road pricing: An idea whose time may never come, A
22A(I) TRANsP. Rss. (1988), at 37-44.
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It is thus difficult to predict accurately, or even conceptualize clearly,
the locus of "consent" for participation in ITS.
On a technological level, the key decisions about privacy in ITS
revolve around a single issue, namely whether the computers in the
system capture information about individual cars or drivers in individ-
ualized form - that is, in a form that is indexed by a unique identifier
for either the car or driver, or by some other code that can be readily
employed to cross-index multiple databases, thus constructing a dos-
sier about a given individual. It is worth emphasizing that this is not
simply a matter of data security. Significant potential dangers from
ITS systems do not derive only from unauthorized access to personal
information. They also derive from institutional pressures to employ
this information for secondary purposes such as marketing. Govern-
ment agencies are today engaged in a great deal of marketing on be-
half of the businesses in their jurisdictions, 6 and ITS information
could facilitate a great expansion of such activities. The proliferation
of computer-mediated tracking systems for numerous categories of
people (immigrants, "deadbeat dads", and so forth) is also a matter of
concern, and imperatives of law enforcement will surely wear down
any institutional protections for individualized ITS data. Perhaps
these secondary uses of ITS data are actually part of the systems' in-
tended functionality, in which case that fact should be openly con-
firmed and debated. It will be assumed here that ITS is intended
solely to facilitate safety and efficiency in highway traffic.
II. COMPUTER SYSTEM DESIGN
Let us first consider the institutions of computer system design.
On a technical level, it seems easy enough to pose the question of
whether ITS should capture individualized information. Yet within
the traditions of system design, this question can only be posed in a
limited and prejudicial way. In another work,7 I have characterized
these traditions in terms of the "capture model". When a system is
meant to support human activities, traditional design methods begin
by fashioning an ontology - a formal system of categories and rela-
tionships to describe the people and things that populate that particular
domain of activity. The next step is to embody this ontology in a
representational scheme, on the assumption that technical means will
be provided to "capture" the relevant aspects of the unfolding activity.
6. PHnp KoTLER, DONAiL H. HAIDER AND IRVING REIN, MARKETINO PLAcEs: AT-
TRAcTNa NVESmiENT, INDUSTRY, AND ToURIsM To Crrms, STATES, AN NATIONS (1993).
7. Philip E. Agre, Surveillance and Capture: Two models ofprivacy, 10(2) THE INFoM.a-
"nON SoCmTY (1994), at 101-127.
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The logic underlying this procedure is simple enough: a computer
can only compute with what it can represent, and it can only represent
what it can capture. The real-time capture of individualized informa-
tion - that is, information indexed by a unique identifier for each
individual - is thus a wholly natural application of standard design
practices. The space of design alternatives is defined in terms of re-
strictions upon the ontology. For example, one might eliminate identi-
fiers for people but retain them for cars, or eliminate identifiers for
cars but retain them for individual "smart cards" that might potentially
be purchased anonymously. Each limitation placed upon the ontology
reduces the potential functionality of the system. Designers will typi-
cally experience the resulting constraints as artificial, and they will not
normally burden themselves with those constraints voluntarily.
It is not an exaggeration to say, then, that privacy invasion is an
inherent tendency of the conventional practices of computer system
design. Alternative technical methods do exist, particularly schemes
like "digital cash" that employ cryptography to authenticate transac-
tions. In a digital cash scheme, individual drivers would carry devices
that generate "cash" (electronically encoded promises to pay certain
sums) and pass these through their financial institution for validation
before sending them to the service provider. Public-key cryptography
assures the service provider of the integrity of the transaction without
necessarily identifying the customer.' If ITS is to avoid capturing
large amounts of individualized data, though, the necessary social de-
cision-making process will be swimming upstream against the con-
ventional practices and the tremendous inertia that they have
developed within the institutions of computing.
III. TECHNICAL STANDARDS
Design practices are not the only source of inertia in technical
choices about privacy. The typical complex technological system
combines elements from a number of vendors, each of which must
also function as part of numerous other systems as well. (Some ex-
ceptions to this rule are found among military systems, which are
often designed with more custom and fewer off-the-shelf parts than
commercial systems.) This means that standards must be defined for
the interfaces among these components. The prototype of such stan-
dards might be pipe threads: pipes and elbows made by different man-
ufacturers can be fastened together if they conform to a common
standard. Standards can arise through a number of mechanisms. One
8. Eamonn Sullivan, Firm has technology you can bank on: With "digital cash", transac-
tions made over public networks remain secure and private, 11(34) PC WnK (1994), at 83-85.
(Vol. 11
REASONING ABOUT THE FUTURE
source of standards is the state: telecommunications standards, for ex-
ample, have historically been negotiated by governments concerned
with the interoperability of national systems. Standards can also arise
through negotiations among alliances of commercial firms, conducted
either through professional associations or (especially in recent times)
privately.9 ITS standard-setting in the United States combines ele-
ments of all three of these mechanisms, particularly if the DOT/iTS
America architecture development project is included.
But standards frequently persist through mechanisms far distant
from the institutions that defined them. Regardless of the origins of
pipe-thread standards, for example, a manufacturer seeking to market
a new line of pipes will be well-advised to conform to the existing
standard for pipe threads. Unless the new pipes are aimed at an en-
tirely new market, they will often need to interconnect with existing
pipes. Manufacturers of computer keyboards, likewise, have a power-
ful interest in conforming to the basic QWERTY layout. Even though
demonstrably superior layouts exist, at no point is it simultaneously in
the interest of enough people to conv&t to any other standard.10
The entrenchment of technical standards in the marketplace has
profound consequences for ITS systems. Some of these have already
been alluded to at the outset. Once a large number of systems has
been deployed that operate according to certain standards, that very
fact will most likely create a powerful economic interest in the perpet-
uation of those standards, even among companies whose products
have not even been designed. Among the most fundamental of stan-
dards for the interoperability of ITS products will be the scheme em-
ployed to define users' interactions with the systems. If this scheme
requires the routine capture of individualized data, then that conven-
tion will most likely become entrenched in the market. Conversely, if
a scheme based on anonymous transactions becomes established then
that scheme will most likely become entrenched instead.
Which of these scenarios emerges will depend on some combina-
tion of government policy, private alliance-building, market demand,
and pure chance. It is entirely possible, for example, that a set of ITS
standards with no priva~y protection beyond simple data security will
emerge haphazardly through incremental extension of existing sys-
tems originally meant for state agencies charged with regulating com-
9. William J. Drake, Europe in the new global standardization environment, in TELECOM-
MUCATIONS IN EUROPE: CHANGING Poucms, SERVICES AND TECHNoLOGxS (Charles Stein-
field, Laurence Caby, and Johannes Bauer, eds.)(1992).
10. Paul A. David, Clio and the economics of QWERTY, 72(2) AM. ECON. REV. (1985), at
332-337.
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mercial truck traffic. On the other hand, it is equally possible that a
different set of standards might grow haphazardly around any of a
number of AVI schemes based on radio-frequency "transponders"
which broadcast their own internal identifier, not that of a person or
car. Or else the architecture development activities being conducted
by DOT and ITS America may function as intended by delivering a
set of standards organized around consciously chosen principles.
IV. CULTURE AND PARTICIPATION
Though brief, this analysis of technical institutions permits a
more careful framing of the crucial question: what are the conditions
of informed social choice about privacy issues in ITS?
Some of these conditions are cultural. Social responses to the
privacy issues raised by new technologies will presumably be condi-
tioned by historical experiences and the symbolic encodings of histori-
cal memory. The single most important cultural understanding of
privacy issues, at least in the United States, is derived from historical
experiences (mostly in Europe) of the secret police. These exper-
iences are most frequently voiced through visual metaphors (as in the
term "surveillance"), and most especially through the allegorical vo-
cabulary of Orwell's 1984 ("Big Brother is Watching You")."
While these cultural forms encode genuine historical experiences of
state oppression, they nonetheless fail to articulate adequately a vari-
ety of other threats to privacy. They are only obliquely relevant to
most projected implementations of ITS, for example, in which partici-
pation is supposed to be voluntary.
"Big Brother" metaphors for technological privacy issues are ac-
curate in one unfortunate way: in both Big Brother's world and our
own, most people have little understanding of the technical and insti-
tutional machinery through which routine surveillance is implemented
in daily life."2
It is a matter of "they know everything about us", without any
very definite reference for the "they" or the "everything". This ab-
stract understanding is unfortunate because it encourages a passive
fatalism about the control of technology, as well as a diffuse and cor-
rosive distrust of the institutions of society.
11. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984: A Novm. (1949); 1984 REVIsIrED: TOTALITARIANISM IN OUR
CENTURY, (Irving Howe, ed.)( 1983).
12. CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEREsT LAW, PRIVACY Iomrs CLEARINGHOUSE, FmisT ANNUAL
REPoRT OF THE PRIVACY RMITs CLEARINGHOUSE, University of San Diego (1993), at 11-13; H.
JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CoRPoRATE AMERICA
(1994). at 146-150.
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One possible condition of informed social choice about ITS, then,
is the "visibility" of the machinery of data-collection. This includes a
variety of disclosure requirements, but it might also include require-
ments that organizations employing personal data collaborate in the
publication of "maps" of the circulation of this data among various
uses. Such visibility might help rectify a broad category of routine
market failures by permitting individuals to make fully informed
choices about the contracts they enter into - most particularly those
adherence contracts which incorporate implicit or otherwise obscure
terms concerning secondary uses of personal information. It might
also provide the grounding in personal experience that permits people
to make informed choices about political matters, including the choice
to commit oneself to activism on particular issues.
The obstacles to genuine public participation in the most conse-
quential decisions about ITS are considerable. These crucial decisions
are located largely in the establishment of technical standards for the
capture and exchange of transactional information. These are, unfor-
tunately, among the earliest and most conceptually obscure decisions
to be made about ITS. Moreover, they are likely to be made as part of
a much larger and heavily interconnected network of decisions, now
being negotiated among a large number of institutional parties. Once
technical standards have become entrenched in the market, it is un-
likely that they will be changed through legislative, administrative, or
judicial action, or through consumer boycotts and the like. The collec-
tive impact of individuals' refusals of privacy-invasive ITS functional-
ities may have some effect, but such a scenario presupposes that
sufficiently many individuals understand the issues and that other
legal and economic pressures permit them the option of refusal as a
practical matter. In any event, the economic forces for standardization
make it unlikely that individuals, or even sizeable organized groups,
would have an adequate bargaining position to force architectural
modifications to large-scale systems that are already in place.
V. CONCLUSION
Lacking effective public participation in the ITS design, it is
likely that the controversy will move from democratic processes into
the realm of symbolic manipulation. Data security will no doubt be
emphasized in place of privacy. Practicality of anonymous use of ITS
will no doubt be exaggerated. Vague and dystopian "Big Brother"
scenarios will continue to fill the newspapers. Nonetheless, a clear
role is emerging for a new form of public activism, in which citizens
versed in technical matters serve as mediators between technical deci-
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sion-making and the broader public. Volunteer activists associated
with a public-interest organization called Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR), for example, have been active in shap-
ing the privacy-related aspects of the state-mandated AVI standards in
California.13 The Internet now brings detailed information on such
issues a rapidly expanding audience, and similar forms of electronic
communications may facilitate more informal and participatory forms
of interchange among government, industry, activists, and the broader
public than is possible through existing media. As a practical matter,
learning to use computer networks for such democratic ends will be a
long and difficult process. The alternative, though, is a technology-
driven revolution in transportation infrastructure that will materially
diminish the ability of citizens to travel and associate without leaving
records behind them.
13. Personal communication with author from Chris Hibbert and Lee Tien of CPSR.
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